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Abstract
This article explores the extent and limits of anti-immigration discourse in recent political 
debates in Turkey. Anti-immigrant discourses have been at the heart of exclusionary 
populisms, where right-wing political actors present immigrants as economic, social 
and security threats. It is remarkable that this is not yet the case in Turkey, one of the 
world’s major refugee-receiving countries. Using an original dataset, composed of party 
programmes, parliamentary records and public statements by presidential candidates in the 
last two rounds of general and presidential elections between 2014 and 2018, we argue that 
politicians from both incumbent and opposition parties in Turkey have used the ‘refugee 
card’ to appeal to the growing social, economic and cultural grievances of their voters but 
in a rather limited and divergent manner. Debates over migration have oscillated between 
the Western European right-wing populist perception of ‘threat’ and the pro-Syrian and 
civilizationist populism of the ruling party that relies on a transnational notion of ‘ummah’.
Introduction
The rise of right-wing populism has widely been 
seen as a threat to diversity. Anti-immigrant dis-
courses have been at the heart of the ‘populist 
turn’ in Europe and the US and served to enlarge 
the voting base of far-right political parties 
(Rydgren 2005; Stockeemer 2016). At the same 
time, empirical research reveals that support 
for right-wing populism has little to do with the 
actual volume of migration (Stockeemer 2016) 
and that the xenophobic language of populists is 
contagious (Rydgren 2005). In this regard, Hogan 
and Haltinner (2015) talk about a ‘transnational 
populist playbook’ that has diffused across the 
Western world and consistently construed immi-
grants within overlapping themes of economic, 
security and identity threats (Hogan and Hal-
tinner 2015). In this paper, we are interested in 
uncovering the extent to which anti-immigration 
populist rhetoric is translated into non-western 
contexts such as Turkey, which is hosting an 
unprecedented number of refugees and where 
the government is held by an Islamist party that 
(selectively) utilizes a civilizationist populist dis-
course at home and abroad. 
Turkey is a major refugee recipient country, 
with over 3.5 million Syrian refugees under tem-
porary protection as well as 300,000 refugees 
mainly from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran. From 
the first day of the Syrian crisis, in 2011, Turkey, 
thanks to its initial open-door policy, received Syr-
ians fleeing civil war; these individuals are often 
referred to as ‘guests’, not ‘refugees’ or ‘asylum 
seekers’, even though this term has no equiva-
lence in international law. ‘Guests’, as used by 
the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), 
is framed in reference to the notion of hospital-
ity, justified through religious fraternity, and indi-
cates an expectation of temporary stay (İçduygu 
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et al. 2017: 460). It was not until 2014 that the 
Turkish government introduced the Temporary 
Protection Regulation (TPR), which provides the 
basis for Syrians to access education, health ser-
vices and vocational training; this is considerably 
more than other asylum seekers in Turkey, who 
have neither access to protection nor such ser-
vices (See Baban, Ilgan and Rygiel 2017 for a criti-
cal evaluation).
Despite the welcoming attitude of the govern-
ment, the presence of Syrians is far from being 
truly embraced at the societal level. Recent stud-
ies show a rise in negative views toward immigra-
tion regardless of party affiliation (Erdoğan 2017; 
Kaya et al. 2019). Occasionally, hashtags such as 
#IdonotwantSyriansinmycountry also become 
trending topics on Twitter in Turkey. One recent 
instance that created backlash was the after-
math of a video showing young Syrian men car-
rying the Free Syrian Army flag, celebrating New 
Year’s Eve 2018 in Istanbul’s Taksim Square. In 
this particular instance, the Ministry of the Inte-
rior was quick to respond to the outrage, giving 
an extensive interview on the situation of Syrians 
in Turkey and emphasizing the religious brother-
hood between Turks and Syrians, as well as their 
shared Ottoman past.1 Even though identity poli-
tics is a prevalent feature of Turkish elections, it 
is remarkable and equally puzzling that, unlike 
political campaigns in Europe or the US during 
the same period, the refugee question was not 
central to the presidential or parliamentary elec-
tion campaigns from 2014 through 2018 and has 
been only marginally extended to party politics 
in general. 
Following Gidron and Bonikowski’s (2013: 27) 
call for empirically grounded analyses of popu-
lism, and incorporating a broad corpus of politi-
cal texts targeting the general public into the 
analysis, we will unpack the puzzle of this rela-
tive absence of immigration debates in electoral 
1 Interview with Minister of the Interior Süleyman 
Soylu, 07.01.2019, Habertürk https://www.haber-
turk.com/icisleri-bakani-suleyman-soylu-turkiye-
deki-suriyelilerin-cogu-misak-i-milli-sinirlari-icin-
den-2283766# (accessed January 7, 2019)
politics in Turkey, making use of an original data-
set consisting of party programmes, parliamen-
tary records and public statements by presiden-
tial candidates in the two rounds of general and 
presidential elections since 2014. While recent 
research on anti-immigration discourse in Tur-
key focuses on media coverage (IGAM 2019; 
Sunata and Yildiz 2018), fewer studies analyse 
statements by political actors (e.g., Ilgıt and 
Memişoğlu 2018, İçduygu et al. 2017). Moreover, 
focusing on the parliamentary debates and not 
only on the discourses of populist leaders or par-
ties opens up the analysis to a diversity of views 
on the subject, reasoned through different ideo-
logical positions (Fletcher 2008). 
The data on parliamentary records was gath-
ered by examining specific periods around elec-
tion times and two key events. The time frames 
are three months before the August 2014 presi-
dential elections, June 2015 and November 
2015 general elections, and June 2018 presi-
dential and general elections. The time frames 
surrounding the key events are defined as 1-30 
March 2016 and 1-15 July 2016, which, respec-
tively, coincide with the signing of the Turkey-
EU deal and Erdoğan’s statement on granting 
citizenship to Syrian refugees. With the help of 
two research assistants, we went through the 
minutes of General Assembly meetings during 
the designated time frames and compiled all 
statements containing the keywords ‘refugee’, 
‘asylum seeker’, ‘migrant’, ‘temporary protec-
tion’, ‘Syrian’ or ‘Syria’. These statements were 
then coded based on a predefined code list, and 
codes were stretched or changed in a grounded 
fashion. Overall, we read and coded party mani-
festos of the Justice and Development Party 
(AKP), Republican People’s Party (CHP), National-
ist Movement Party (MHP), People’s Democratic 
Party (HDP) and Good Party (IYI Party), in addi-
tion to 408 individual statements from members 
of the General Assembly.2 
2 Of these individual statements194 were related to 
the conflict in Syria; all others regarded Syrian refu-
gees in Turkey.
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The article first provides a review of the lit-
erature, in which populist politics in Turkey is 
situated within two global trends: the rise of 
anti-immigrant populism in Western countries 
and Islamic populism in predominantly Muslim 
countries. Following Kaya et al. (2019) and, to a 
certain extent, Brubaker (2017), these could be 
conceptualized as opposite camps within the 
civilizationist paradigm. Against this background, 
the main part of the article explores the extent 
and limits of anti-immigration discourse in recent 
political debates in Turkey. Our analysis reveals 
that both incumbent and opposition parties in 
Turkey have used the ‘refugee card’ to appeal to 
the growing social, economic and cultural griev-
ances of their voters, but in a rather selective and 
limited manner. While AKP’s civilizationist popu-
lism has grown, contrasting with the European 
example by rhetorically including Syrian refugees 
in the definition of ‘the people’, the article also 
points out its perils in fuelling existing discontent 
and societal cleavages, especially in the absence 
(or silencing) of rights-based discourses recog-
nizing existing ethnic and religious diversity in 
Turkey. In the light of our findings, in the final 
section, we discuss why politicians’ use of anti-
immigration discourse has so far remained lim-
ited in Turkey. 
Diversity of populisms, anti-immigration 
rhetoric and Turkey 
While there is general acceptance of the fact that 
populism inevitably entails a moral counter-posi-
tion of ‘the people’ vs. ‘the elite’ (e.g., Mudde 
2004), there is considerable disagreement about 
its further characterizing features and its inclu-
sionary and exclusionary variations. One impor-
tant contestation, as aptly put by Brubaker (2019), 
remains between nationalism and populism—at 
both the conceptual and empirical level—not 
the least due to the intertwinement and success 
of populist and anti-immigrant discourses empir-
ically observed across Europe in the last decade. 
More importantly, however, Brubaker (2019: 
13) underlines that such conceptual ambiguity 
is integral to and constitutive of populism since 
‘populist claims-making is located at the juncture 
of the politics of inequality and the politics of 
identity, where questions about who gets what 
are constitutively intertwined with questions 
about who is what’ (emphasis original). Such 
exclusionary populist narratives target ‘elites’, 
who are perceived simultaneously as being at 
the top of society and as outsider to a given 
society. Therefore, following Brubaker (2017, 
2019) and other scholars (e.g., Arditi 2007; Mül-
ler 2016), we understand populist discourses as 
inherently anti-pluralist and majoritarian dis-
courses that construe diversity as a threat to 
social cohesion and constantly create demonized 
out-groups: minorities, migrants, dissidents and 
opposition parties and politicians (Filc 2009 cited 
in Yabanci 2016). Therefore, our definition aligns 
more with what Mudde and Kaltwasser (2013) 
identified as ‘exclusionary populism’ that is most 
prevalent in Europe. However, our focus is on 
discourses and the extent to which political par-
ties in Turkey employ the populist card against 
refugees, which is regardless of whether or not 
the political parties themselves are characterized 
as populist per se. 
The conceptual and empirical ambiguity of the 
term ‘populism’ has led to intense debates about 
the line separating populist anti-immigrant and 
far-right parties, which has proven hard to draw. 
While van Spanje (2011) demonstrates that 
these are not identical in Western Europe, and 
Stavrakakis et al. (2017: 421) describe the most-
well known examples—such as the National 
Front in France—as nationalist and only sec-
ondarily as ‘populist’, others treat right-wing or 
radical-right populist parties as quintessentially 
nativist and thereby anti-immigrant and/or anti-
minority (e.g., Akkerman, de Lange and Rooduijn 
2016; Mudde 2013). Moreover, significant dif-
fusion effects have been noted as they bor-
row from each other’s master frames (Rydgren 
2005). According to Hogan and Haltinner (2015), 
similarities in the immigration threat narratives 
of right-wing political parties and social move-
ments, especially in Western democracies, indi-
cate a shared ‘transnational populist playbook’ 
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in which, regardless of the volume of immigra-
tion, immigrants are represented as economic 
and social threats, blamed as the main reason 
for crime, and demonized as the ‘enemy Other’. 
For Brubaker (2017), this is a particularly North-
ern and Western European populist moment, 
distinctive in the sense that the opposition 
between the self and the other is defined not 
in narrow national but in broader civilizational 
terms as a liberal defence against the threat of 
Islam (see also Akkerman 2005; Betz and Meret 
2009).
While it is important to record the rise of anti-
immigration position in the West, which is very 
much infused with anti-Islamic discourse, studies 
examining various faces of populism in different 
parts of the world hint at deep-seated anxieties 
about the negative social and economic effects 
of globalization (see, for example, Aytac and Onis 
2014; Hadiz and Chrysseogelos 2017). In his com-
parative study of three Muslim-majority societ-
ies, namely Indonesia, Egypt and Turkey, Hadiz 
shows how such grievances can be rebranded 
under what he calls ‘Islamic populism’ (Hadiz 
2016: 28). He demonstrates that in Muslim-
majority societies, the combination of post-Cold 
War era social conflicts, post-9/11 context and 
post-Arab Spring political conflicts has led to the 
concept of the ‘ummah’ (community of believ-
ers) being increasingly defined in national terms 
and a substitute for the notion of ‘the people’ 
united against ‘social orders that are perceived 
to be inherently exclusionary, unjust and there-
fore simultaneously immoral’ (Hadiz 2016: 12). 
As Kaya et al. (2019) argue, this can be partly 
seen as the flip side of the same civilizationist 
populist discourse found in the West. 
Over the course of its uninterrupted single-
party rule since 2002, the AKP has capitalized 
on ‘the people vs. Kemalist elite/establishment 
dichotomy’ at home and the rising anti-Islamist 
civilizationist narratives abroad. While populism 
is not a new phenomenon in Turkish politics 
(see Baykan 2014 for a history of the concept), 
the AKP has managed to sustain a hegemonic 
populism by not only creatively re-producing 
its character as the guardian of ‘the people’ but 
also through consecutive election wins (Çınar 
2015; Dincsahin 2012; Hadiz 2016; Yabanci 2016). 
Since the 2010s, when AKP’s ‘conquest of the 
state’ (Somer 2017) left it with no establishment 
actors to blame, its populist strategy continued 
targeting the CHP—the main opposition party—
and, increasingly, Western actors (Aytaç and Elçi 
2019; Elçi 2019). Therefore, the AKP’s populist 
discourse has decidedly moved into a civilization-
ist discourse that revitalizes and instrumentalizes 
Turkey’s Ottoman heritage and takes its strength 
from the claim of being ‘the center of the Muslim 
ummah’ (Kaya et al. 2019: 6). In the face of the 
mass migration of majority Sunni Syrians fleeing 
from Assad’s suppression, this civilizationist pop-
ulist style has manifested itself in religious broth-
erhood narratives that pit Turkey’s hospitality 
against the indifference of the West. Critiques of 
the AKP’s open-door policy have developed as 
part and parcel of this hegemonic civilizationist 
populist style, taking different forms depending 
on the ideological distance between the incum-
bent AKP and opposition parties. 
When it comes to anti-immigrant populist dis-
courses in Turkey, our knowledge is still limited. 
The literature on attitudes toward migration-
related issues is rather new and overwhelmingly 
focuses on public opinion and media representa-
tion. Erdoğan’s (2017) longitudinal data on pub-
lic attitudes towards Syrians shows increasing 
levels of ‘othering’ against Syrians. Even though 
both the media (Sunata and Yıldız 2018) and 
public continue to define Syrians as victims, the 
distance between the citizens and refugees has 
grown from welcoming guests towards a ‘reluc-
tant acceptance’ (Erdoğan 2017). Most recent 
media reports emphasize an increase in the use 
of criminalizing language (IGAM 2019). Kaya et 
al. (2019) also show that even AKP voters who 
otherwise endorsed its revitalization of Otto-
man heritage were critical of the Syrian presence 
out of fear of radicalization and socio-economic 
competition. Ilgıt and Memisoglu’s (2018) con-
tribution provides a broad description of how 
the opposition parties in Turkey approach Syrian 
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in 2018—with the important exception of HDP—
put much more emphasis on return to Syria as a 
longer-term solution.
As mentioned above, here we analyse state-
ments of both members of the ruling AKP and 
opposition parties represented in the parlia-
ment. The CHP is the main opposition party, with 
a secular and modernist stance. The MHP is a 
right-wing nationalist party, with a statist and 
pan-Turkist approach. Although the party is not 
in the government, it has recently moved from 
opposition to a de facto alliance with the ruling 
party in the aftermath of the coup attempt in July 
2016. The IYI Party has been newly founded by 
former MHP members and takes a clear anti-gov-
ernment stance while maintaining the nationalist 
agenda. The HDP represents the Kurdish move-
ment but also has a close alliance with smaller 
factions of socialist and green movements in Tur-
key. 
As the Syrian conflict has continued and the 
number of arrivals has increased, we observe that 
the CHP strikingly changed its position of ‘con-
temporary hospitality’ (çağdaş evsahipliği) from 
the 2015 general election manifesto. The 2015 
manifesto entailed several measures for improv-
ing access to education, healthcare, and hous-
ing of Syrian refugees, albeit keeping in mind an 
eventual return. Instead, in 2018, the CHP prom-
ised a ‘voluntary, gradual and safe return process 
of Syrians under temporary protection’. Simi-
larly, the IYI Party, under the motto ‘everyone is 
happy in his/her homeland’, exclusively focused 
on issues of return and measures to ensure the 
temporariness of the refugee presence in Turkey, 
such as an immediate halt of protection statuses, 
cooperation with the Syrian state for repatriation 
and establishment of camps in Syria. 
Moreover, in 2018, the presidential candidates 
of both parties addressed the return issue in 
their electoral campaigns. CHP candidate Muhar-
rem Ince, in a rare televised interview, stated that 
if he were to be elected, he would close the door 
to Syrian refugees who returned to Syria for Eid: 
‘If you can go back for ten days, why do you come 
to Turkey? Is it a soup kitchen here? My citizens 
refugees either as rival victim group with unfair 
access to public services, or a demographic 
threat. 
Here, we examine what happens to anti-immi-
grant rhetoric across the political spectrum when 
the incumbent party itself follows a civilizationist 
populist style which, contrary to the European 
context, selectively includes refugees in its defi-
nition of ‘the people’ yet reproduces existing 
ethno-religious cleavages and shies away from 
any rights-based discourses. Most of the oppo-
sition parties remain incapable of challenging 
AKP’s hegemonic populism since they are not 
against maintaining kinship ties with populations 
in the old Ottoman territories. Their critique 
of the AKP’s badly managed open-door policy 
does not go beyond accusing the incumbent 
AKP of populist and instrumental use of Syrian 
refugees against the West without calculating its 
costs on Turkey’s economy. Our analysis, there-
fore, reveals that the dominant rhetoric of the 
incumbent AKP—based on an understanding of 
religious nationhood and Ottoman heritage that 
is difficult for opposition parties to challenge—
offers plausible explanations for the relatively 
low degree of anti-immigration discourse and 
its corresponding salience in electoral politics in 
Turkey. 
Refugees as part of election campaigns: 
Limited to no populism
While immigration has arguably not yet been 
at the centre of political debates in Turkey, the 
arrival of over 3.5 million Syrians over a short 
period has prompted emerging debates on the 
issue. A comparison of the party manifestos that 
appeared prior to the 2015 parliamentary elec-
tions and 2018 parliamentary and presidential 
elections demonstrated increasing space dedi-
cated to refugees/asylum seekers and exposed 
its heightened significance in domestic politics. 
However, this growth in attention does not nec-
essarily mean that refugees are cast in a more 
positive light, nor that more durable measures 
are being proposed. Instead, compared to 2015, 
manifestos from across the political spectrum 
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are unemployed’.3 Similarly, during a rally in 
Mersin, IYI Party candidate Meral Akşener pro-
claimed: ‘Today 200,000 refugees live in Mersin. 
Our standard of living has declined. I promise you 
that we will be breaking the fast during Rama-
dan in 2019 in Syria’.4 Especially in public state-
ments that take a more accusatory tone towards 
the AKP, the return of refugees—which in and 
of itself positions them outside ‘the people’—
is more clearly linked to concerns with welfare 
and the economy. This is very much in line with 
the ‘transnational populist playbook’ (Hogan and 
Haltinner 2015), according to which populist dis-
courses construct migrants as economic threats, 
among others.
When it comes to the ruling AKP, it can be 
noted that the party devoted significantly more 
space to the migration theme in 2018 than in 
2015.5 In line with the rest of its 2018 mani-
festo, the section on migration served the dual 
purpose of presenting AKP achievements, most 
notably the steps they have taken to improve the 
legal and socio-economic status of Syrians, and 
promises for the future. It contained a lengthy 
discussion about services provided to refugees, 
including cash transfers, without mentioning that 
the latter is funded by the EU or any reference 
to the EU-Turkey deal. While the 2018 manifesto 
vaguely mentioned measures for Syrians and 
3 ‘Muharrem İnce: Suriyelilere kapıyı kapatacağım’ 
(‘Muharrem Ince: I am going to close the door to Syr-
ians’), Haber 7, 25.05.2018 http://www.haber7.com/
siyaset/haber/2633477-muharrem-ince-suriyelilere-
kapiyi-kapatacagim (accessed February 19, 2019). 
4 ‘Akşener, 2019’a kadar mültecileri göndereceğini 
söyledi’ (‘Akşener said she would return Syrians by 
2019’). Siyasi Haber, 05.06.2018 http://siyasihaber4.
org/aksener-2019a-kadar-multecileri-gonderecegi-
ni-soyledi (accessed February 19, 2019).
5 All party manifestos are available in Turkish. 
 For the AKP 2018 manifesto, see https://www.
trthaber.com/pdf/Beyanname23Mays18_icSayfalar.
pdf
 For the MHP, see https://www.mhp.org.tr/usr_img/
mhpweb/1kasimsecimleri/beyanname_1kasim2015.
pdf
 For the CHP, see http://secim2018.chp.org.tr/files/
CHP-SecimBildirgesi-2018-icerik.pdf
 For the İYİ Party, see https://iyiparti.org.tr/assets/
pdf/secim_beyani.pdf 
integration policies referred to as ‘harmonization’ 
(uyum) by the Turkish bureaucracy, it suggested 
more concrete measures for voluntary returns 
and deportations. It, for instance, announced 
the establishment of a national mechanism for 
voluntary return that literally translates as the 
‘National Voluntary Return Mechanism’ (‘Milli 
Gönüllü Geri Dönüş Mekanizmasi’), which at 
least discursively distinguishes it from Interna-
tional Organization for Migration-led ‘assisted 
voluntary returns’. Moreover, the safe return 
of a considerable number of migrants currently 
under temporary protection at the end of their 
stay was presented as the fundamental aim. 
The nationalist right-wing MHP, which par-
ticipated in an alliance with the AKP in the June 
2018 elections, had barely anything on migration 
in its manifesto. This was a drastic shift when 
compared to its 2015 manifesto, which strongly 
emphasized not only repatriation of asylum seek-
ers but also offered a very criminalized image 
that associated migrants with societal problems 
such as theft, drug dealing, prostitution, etc. As 
a newcomer to the game, the IYI Party was much 
more eager to capitalize on the societal cleav-
ages and discontent that Turkish citizens are 
reportedly experiencing with the Syrian popula-
tion, emphasizing the ‘burden’ refugees put on 
the Turkish economy, and promised to embrace 
non-arrival policies and not accept new refugees. 
The CHP, along with voluntary return, had an 
explicit focus on the integration and wellbeing 
of migrants, particularly on issues of exploita-
tion and child labour. The party programme also 
promised to ensure transparency and account-
ability in the aid channelled to Syrian refugees. 
At the opposite end of the spectrum stands the 
HDP which, in both the 2015 and 2018 manifes-
tos, consistently raised a pro-migrant voice. The 
HDP called for lifting the geographical limitation 
reservation applied to the Geneva Convention 
by Turkey, instituting equal citizenship, and the 
right to education in the mother tongue. The 
HDP manifesto is also the only one to point out 
the increasing level of hate speech and violent 
attacks against refugees in Turkey. 
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What is also important to note across differ-
ent party manifestos is the choice of terms used 
in reference to the Syrian population in Turkey; 
this is also emblematic of the parties’ definitions 
of ‘the people’. The AKP, very much in line with 
its neo-Ottomanist aspirations and strategic use 
of Islamic populist tools, almost unequivocally 
used ‘asylum seeker brothers’ or ‘Syrian broth-
ers’. These designations clearly target domestic 
politics but seem to find more resonance among 
Syrians, who consider themselves to be culturally 
similar to Turkish citizens, than among Turkish cit-
izens, who rarely consider Syrians culturally simi-
lar (Erdoğan 2017). The AKP manifesto, at times, 
used the alternative of ‘Syrian guests’, ironically 
more so in the section on foreign policy, which 
has ‘refugees’ in its subtitle. All other parties 
refrained from using the term ‘refugee’, instead 
preferring ‘asylum seekers’, ‘Syrians under tem-
porary protection’, or ‘our Syrian guests’ in the 
case of the IYI Party. HDP was the only party that 
talked about ‘refugees’ and openly challenged 
the ‘guest’ terminology.
AKP’s hegemonic populist discourse, different 
from the Western-type populist discourse, does 
not have the effect of discrediting or criminal-
izing entire populations of migrants but instead 
selectively includes and excludes migrants 
based on existing societal cleavages. Despite 
the deliberately furthered ‘guest’ terminology 
and emphasis on return, the 2018 parliamentary 
elections were exceptional; a Syrian-origin Turk-
ish businessman who entertains good relations 
with Saudi Arabian investors became a candi-
date through the AKP ranks in Bursa.6 The AKP 
choice of such a candidate is indicative of its self-
assigned leadership role in the ummah and selec-
tive inclusion of refugees in ‘the people’. Devoid 
of a genuine rights-based approach, humani-
tarianism remains dominant at the discursive 
level for the AKP, but this does not lend itself 
6 ‘Suriyeli İş Adamı AK Parti’den Milletvekili Adayı 
Oldu’ (‘Syrian businessman is an MP candidate for 
AK Party’), 22.05.2018, https://www.haberler.com/
suriyeli-is-adami-ak-parti-den-milletvekili-adayi-
10876208-haberi/ (accessed February 19, 2019).
to concrete measures for the integration of all 
newcomers. The AKP has consistently continued 
to employ the strategic tools of Islamic/civiliza-
tionist hegemonic populism, not only presenting 
the refugees as brothers (read as Sunni broth-
ers) but also itself as a patriarchal figure and the 
only one capable of extending protection. The 
IYI Party in 2018 and MHP in 2015, at both the 
party and leadership level, can be considered to 
have had recourse to the anti-immigrant senti-
ments observed in the ‘transnational populist 
playbook’, resorting to the widespread ‘threat 
narratives’ (Hogan and Halttiner 2015) found in 
the West, particularly that of ‘economic burden’. 
Their definitions of ‘the people’ were more in 
national than civilizationist terms. While the CHP 
presidential candidate also briefly played the 
anti-immigrant card, both the party’s manifes-
tos and leader’s statements repeatedly reflected 
concerns about integration, an emphasis on the 
possibility of voluntary return and a critique of 
the AKP-led civilizationist populist discourse. The 
only political party that maintained an inclusion-
ary approach towards immigration in line with its 
pluralist understanding of ‘the people’ was the 
HDP. The plural use of ‘we’ in the party slogan 
for the June 2015 elections, ‘We(s) are headed 
to the parliament!’ (‘Biz’ler meclise!’), was a clear 
counter-discourse to the ‘us versus them’ lan-
guage of AKP’s hegemonic populism. 
Refugees in the general assembly agenda
Plurality of populist discourses
It should be noted that policies concerning refu-
gees have been introduced by the government 
at the level of decrees and regulations. There-
fore, in most cases, parliamentary debates do 
not revolve around immigration policies. Rather, 
general discussions on various issues on the 
agenda of the parliament are infused with con-
cerns over refugees. The debates remain over-
whelmingly concentrated on two key points: a) 
either critique or praise of AKP-led foreign policy, 
b) whether and how refugees would (not) be 
welcome depending on the politicians’ take on 
the existing societal cleavages and kinship ties. 
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This is followed by an emphasis on security and 
criminalization issues; there is a slight increase 
in emphasis on return, not only from opposition 
parties but also from the government. Discus-
sions on the integration of Syrian refugees, on 
the other hand, are close to non-existent and 
did not significantly increase over time, despite 
empirical evidence that a considerable portion 
of Syrian refugees in Turkey, especially the youth, 
are likely to stay rather than return to Syria 
(Erdoğan 2017). 
During parliamentary discussions, representa-
tives of opposition parties usually depict Syrian 
refugees as security and social threats, a threat 
to public health due to the rise in certain conta-
gious diseases, an economic burden and source 
of rising unemployment and, related to that, a 
source of crime with a high potential for commit-
ting criminal offenses. MPs from all opposition 
parties allude to Syrians’ presence in the country 
as being ‘out of control’, ‘costly’, a ‘demographic 
threat’, or ‘turning the country into a huge ref-
ugee camp’. ‘You filled Turkey with 2.5 million 
Syrians; 600,000 of them live in Gaziantep. You 
turned upside down our country, our city, our 
balance, dear friends’, says Akif Ekici, CHP MP 
from Gaziantep, a major refugee recipient city in 
the South-eastern part of Turkey, near the Syr-
ian border.7 Even HDP MPs, particularly the ones 
with constituencies in the border regions, have, 
in time, echoed the economic and social threat 
arguments of other opposition parties. 
Refugees are also often portrayed as a security 
threat and subjected to criminalizing discourses, 
which have taken the form of being blamed for 
criminal offences such as theft8 or drug dealing.9 
Additionally, they are often associated with ter-
rorist groups, mainly because the government’s 
7 TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session 49, 01.03.2016. 
https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem26/yil1/
ham/b04901h.htm. All statements are translated 
from Turkish by the authors.
8  Kadir Gökmen Öğüt (CHP), TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 
Session 117, 16.07.2014. https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/
tutanak/donem24/yil4/ham/b11701h.htm
9 Mehmet Erdoğan (MHP), TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, 
Session 50, 02.03.2016. https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/
tutanak/donem26/yil1/ham/b05001h.htm
open-door policy, coupled with a lack of proper 
registration, allowed the entry of an uniden-
tifiable population where it is not possible to 
distinguish between ‘real asylum seekers’ and 
‘terrorists with blood on their hands’.10 Echoing 
debates on the radicalization of Muslim minor-
ity youth in Western Europe, a CHP MP from 
the eastern province of Tunceli raised concerns 
that ‘Syrians have become a natural human 
resource within the reach of all terrorist groups 
in Turkey’.11 Criminalizing statements that incul-
pate refugees for terrorist attacks have been 
more prevalent after triggering events in 2016, 
such as the Atatürk airport bombing in Istanbul 
and the failed bomb attack in Reyhanli, which 
had already been hit in May 2013 by a deadly ISIS 
attack. During discussions following President 
Erdoğan’s announcement of the government’s 
plan to grant citizenship to Syrians, a CHP MP 
draws attention to cases of homicide, blames all 
Syrians for several ISIS-related terrorist attacks, 
and reminds parliament that ‘it is again those 
from Syria who caused the killing of our 44 citi-
zens at Atatürk airport’.12 
Despite such clear critiques towards the imple-
mentation of the AKP’s open-door policy and its 
implications, members of opposition parties also 
commonly refer to Syrians as ‘brothers’ or ‘fel-
low Muslims’ and to hospitality as a quality of the 
Turkish nation. This rhetoric of selective humani-
tarianism, based on shared culture and religion, 
was initiated by the governing party (İçduygu et 
al. 2017); but the opposition has also embraced 
it in different ways, depending on their defini-
tions of ‘the people’. Along with religious iden-
tity, ongoing kinship ties in the region prevents 
people fleeing from Syria being seen as ‘the ulti-
mate other’. MHP MPs, in particular, underline 
10 Hilmi Yarayıcı (CHP), TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Ses-
sion 111, 12.07.2016. https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tu-
tanak/donem26/yil1/ham/b11101h.htm
11 Gürsel Erol (CHP). TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session 
50, 02.03.2016. https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/
donem26/yil1/ham/b05001h.htm
12 Özkan Yalım, TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session 111, 
12.07.2016. https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/do-
nem26/yil1/ham/b11101h.htm
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the organic unity between Turkmens and Turks, 
showing discomfort with the differential treat-
ment received by Syrian Arabs at the border and 
not extended to Syrian Turkmens. For instance, 
MHP MP Sinan Oğan, in a heated exchange, asks 
provocatively: ‘Why do you close the border to 
Turkmens? What is their fault? Being Turkmen? 
If they were Arabs, you would have opened the 
border immediately […] They would not be a bur-
den; do not worry, the AKP might not take care of 
them, but the Turkish nation would’.13 Similarly, 
HDP MPs are concerned with the protection 
and rights of Syrian Kurds as part of ‘the people’, 
although they try to frame the issue as more 
multicultural, using inclusionary language. HDP 
MP Erol Dora, for instance, drew attention to the 
provision of education in the mother tongue that 
is provided to Sunni Arab children in camps but 
not to children from Kurdish, Assyrian, and Yezidi 
backgrounds.14 
A more often employed Western-style anti-
immigrant populist frame flirting with nativism 
is the ‘privileged’ treatment of Syrians vis-a-vis 
Turkish citizens. Here, critiques from opposition 
parties either emphasize the budget spent on the 
reception of Syrian refugees or the rights granted 
to them. They all imply that scarce resources 
should be devoted to the country’s ‘own citizens’ 
rather than spent on the refugees, as the former 
are also in precarious situations. CHP MP Kazım 
Arslan, for instance, states that the 10-billion-
dollar budget spent on asylum seekers could 
have been invested in establishing a manufac-
turing site employing 5,000 people. ‘How much 
more are we going to spend on Syrians?’, he con-
tinues, ‘How much more money that could have 
been spent on factories will vanish?’15 During 
the intense debate on granting citizenship, oppo-
13 TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session 128, 04.08.2014, 
https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem24/yil4/
ham/b12801h.htm 
14 TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session 83, 24.03.2015 
https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem24/yil4/
ham/b11001h.htm 
15 TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session 55, 07.03.2016. 
https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem26/yil1/
ham/b05501h.htm
sition MPs criticized the allocation of TOKI, Turk-
ish government-supported housing, to Syrian ref-
ugees. While CHP MP Tur Yıldız Biçer asserts that 
such aid ‘hit a nerve’ with the poor and disadvan-
taged sections of society, MHP MP Baki Şimşek 
urges the government to prioritize the families 
and relatives of the martyrs rather than Syrians.16
Aside from such financial costs of the AKP’s 
open-door policy, the alleged preferential access 
of Syrians with Temporary Protection Status (TPS) 
to public services has also become a matter of 
contention. CHP MP Refik Eryılmaz, for instance, 
is very critical of the government policy allegedly 
providing Syrian students access to higher edu-
cation with scholarships and without any prior 
requirements, whereas it is costly for Turkish citi-
zens to prepare for the entrance exams. ‘Their 
[Syrian students’] accommodation, school fees 
and all costs are paid by the government. The 
common citizen would ask then’, he continues, 
‘why do you discriminate? If young people com-
ing from abroad are given such an opportunity, 
our own citizens should have it too’.17 In these 
latter examples, we see even more clearly the 
intertwinement of the politics of inequality and 
the politics of identity (Brubaker 2019) that lies 
at the very heart of the populist rhetoric. ‘The 
people’ are not only invoked as a nationally-
bounded community but also as plebs who suffer 
under the unequal redistribution policies of the 
ruling party.
In addition to the use of populist rhetoric, 
opposition MPs also show a readiness to utilize 
plebiscitary tools such as referenda, a strategy 
that is by now part and parcel of the AKP’s popu-
list reign, which dismantle horizontal checks in 
favour of direct communication with ‘the people’ 
(Aytac and Elci 2019; Castaldo 2018). CHP and 
MHP MPs openly call for a referendum soon 
after President Erdoğan unveils his plan to grant 
16 TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session 111, 12.07.2016, 
https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem26/yil1/
ham/b11101h.htm 
17 TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session 80, 19.03.2015 
https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem24/yil5/
ham/b08001h.htm 
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citizenship to Syrians. After claiming that ‘Syr-
ians are into crime, they are low-educated and 
the country does not need an immigrant labour 
force’, CHP MP Özkan Yalım proclaims: ‘Let’s 
ask our people and go to a referendum with-
out any hesitation or fear so that the citizens of 
the Turkish Republic can choose the people to 
live with.’18
Limits to anti-immigrant populist discourses
As portrayed so far, unlike the AKP represen-
tation of Syrian refugees as part of the same 
ummah, opposition MPs’ critiques often reflect 
widely differing understandings of ‘the people’ 
as well as public (mis)perceptions of refugees 
that feed into concerns regarding public safety, 
security and financial costs. On the other hand, 
some MPs from across the political spectrum 
show awareness of the danger of further trig-
gering anti-immigration sentiments among the 
population. Their concerns are well-founded, as 
the latest results of public opinion and media 
research cited above show the fragility of this 
living together arrangement. They perceive the 
debate over granting citizenship as potentially 
explosive and a source of already-reported soci-
etal clashes in different cities within Turkey. CHP 
MP Özgür Özel claims that emphasis on the 
rivalry over resources between citizens and Syr-
ians invites hostility, ‘polarization’ and a ‘lynch 
culture’. While calling on everyone to be cau-
tious about such statements, Özel also under-
lines that it is foremost the responsibility of the 
government to avoid such tensions.19 MHP MP 
Ruhi Ersoy stresses that, because of the way it 
was brought up by the president and the govern-
ment, such a citizenship debate carries the risk of 
creating anti-Syrian attitudes among ‘the citizens 
who have thus far, with love and tolerance, tried 
to help Syrians, thinking that they will one day 
return to their homeland’.20 Similarly, HDP MP 
18 TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session 111, 12.07.2016 
https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem26/yil1/
ham/b11101h.htm 
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
Idris Baluken criticizes the AKP move of making 
Syrians part of the existing political polarization, 
which could potentially increase the number 
of assaults. Unlike other opposition MPs, how-
ever, he references international law and states 
that the first move should be the granting of 
refugee status to prove that the government is 
not again instrumentalizing Syrians as they did 
against the EU.21 
The opposition MPs’ critique of the govern-
ment’s reception policy is overwhelmingly mixed 
with their discontent with AKP errors in foreign 
policy, especially in the early years of the Syrian 
conflict. Similarly, the use of Syrians as a bargain-
ing chip against the EU is overtly criticized by 
opposition MPs from all parties. At the time when 
the EU-Turkey deal came into effect, CHP MP Faik 
Öztrak draws attention to the link between the 
deal and Turkey’s foreign policy mistakes when 
he says, ‘the then-prime minister said “I will 
conduct my prayer in the Umayyad Mosque in 
Damascus.” He could not pray in Damascus, but 
the yard of every mosque of Turkey’s 81 cities is 
full of Syrian refugees.22 Similarly, HDP MP Garo 
Paylan criticizes AKP sectarianism in the Syrian 
conflict, an important display of its civilization-
ist approach, by saying ‘the government did the 
only thing they know […], sending arms to only 
those from their own sect. But, what did we get 
in return? Only blood and tears, and 3 million 
migrants, and we used those 3 million migrants 
for blackmail’.23 Several MPs from across the 
political spectrum discredit the deal as a ‘Faus-
tian bargain’ (at, koyun, Kayseri pazarlığı)24 and 
blame the government for acting like a ‘night 
watchman’ for refugees making sure they remain 
in Turkish territory in exchange for money. In that 
sense, the main critique of the opposition lies 
21 Ibid. 
22 TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session 57, 09.03.2016 
https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem26/yil1/
ham/b05701h.htm
23 TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session 51, 03.03.2016 
https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem26/yil1/
ham/b05101h.htm 
24 Literally translates as “horse, sheep, Kayseri bar-
gain”. 
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in foreign policy choices, and refugees are per-
ceived mainly as the victims of external relations 
vis-a-vis the Syrian conflict and the West.
During the parliamentary debates on the 
approval of the EU-Turkey readmission deal, in 
order to rebut the critiques mentioned above, 
several AKP MPs intervene to say ‘May God keep 
anyone [in need of help] away from your door’ 
and display their understanding of the motiva-
tions of refugees by saying ‘no one would want 
to leave their home’.25 While this pro-immigrant 
discourse complements the government’s open-
door policy towards Syrians at the time, it is 
also used to avoid addressing the main critique, 
namely employing a selective pro-immigrant pol-
icy that is part and parcel of AKP’s civilizationist 
populist discourse. While the open-door policy 
has come to a halt, from the November 2015 elec-
tion period onward, AKP MPs have repeatedly 
glorified the refugee policy and the hospitality of 
the Turkish nation, emphasizing the moral supe-
riority of Turkey over the Western world. During 
the opening of the second half of the 25th legis-
lative year in 2015, President Erdoğan underlines 
that ‘for the last four years, by adopting over 2 
million Syrian and Iraqi brothers, Turkey has gone 
beyond doing her neighbourly duties and saved 
the honour of humanity’.26 Such references to 
religious brotherhood and celebration of the 
government’s hospitality as an attribute of the 
Turkish nation also indicate a core component of 
its civilizationist populism, underscoring the con-
trast between the ‘generous us’ and the ‘immoral, 
xenophobic other’, especially with reference to 
Western European countries. A recent example 
of this is AKP MP Şahap Kavcıoğlu’s response to 
opposition MPs: ‘Instead of being proud of, you 
fling dirt at a country that earns the appreciation 
of the world by providing 4 million refugees with 
all kinds of needs, maintenance and lodging [in 
25 TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session 108, 25.06.2014. 
https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem24/yil4/
ham/b10801h.htm 
26 TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session 1, 01.10.2015 
https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem25/yil2/
ham/b00101h.htm
Turkey], and sends the highest amount of social 
aid across the world’.27
Despite this rhetoric of benevolence and moral 
superiority, debates on the current situation of 
Syrians in Turkey are centred on their temporari-
ness and return options. In 2015, integration was 
brought up as a possible next step by a few CHP 
and HDP MPs; this idea has slowly faded away, 
ceding ground to a sound return policy that has 
also been gradually picked up by incumbent AKP 
MPs. Strikingly, the ruling AKP has centred its 
return discourse on the success of Turkish mili-
tary operations in Syria that have allegedly cre-
ated ‘safe zones’ where people may return.28 
AKP MP Çiğdem Karaaslan proudly announces: 
‘with the Olive Branch Operation that we initi-
ated on 20 January 2018, we cleansed Afrin 
of terrorists on the 103rd anniversary of the 
Çanakkale triumph. Our Syrian brothers who had 
to leave their homes and homelands have now 
begun to return in peace and security’.29 The res-
olution allowing military interventions has been 
accepted and extended in the assembly with the 
support of the AKP, MHP, and CHP.30 Once again, 
effectively blending the issue with existing soci-
etal cleavages [i.e., the long-lasting conflict with 
the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and national-
ist pride as in the reference to the Independence 
War], the AKP has taken hold of the discursive 
upper hand with little opposition.
In other words, while opposition MPs often 
criticize the government’s use of the refugee 
card for political gain at home and abroad, the 
incumbent AKP rebuts any criticism through a 
27 TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session 80, 03.04.2018 
https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem26/yil3/
ham/b08001h.htm 
28 “Over 300,000 Syrians returned home after Tur-
key’s operations, interior minister says” Daily Sa-
bah, 10.02.2019 https://www.dailysabah.com/
politics/2019/02/18/over-300000-syrians-returned-
home-after-turkeys-operations-interior-minister-
says (accessed February 19, 2019).
29 TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Session 87, 18.04.2018 
https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanak/donem26/yil3/
ham/b08701h.htm 
30 Operation Euphrates Shield between 24 August 
2016 and 27 March 2017, the ongoing Olive Branch 
Operation since January 2018.
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civilizationist populist discourse that selectively 
extends the boundaries of ‘the people’. This 
operates as a hegemonic populism that justifies 
AKP policies towards Syrians and foreign policy 
towards Syria through a discourse of brother-
hood and references to a shared Ottoman legacy. 
It is a hegemonic populism maintained by claim-
ing the moral superiority of Turkey over the West, 
which has long turned a blind eye to the human 
costs of the Syrian crisis and the pressing needs 
of forcibly displaced Syrians. 
Conclusion
This article has provided an overview of the 
debates on immigration in electoral politics in 
Turkey and assessed the extent to which dis-
courses on immigration in the context of the Syr-
ian conflict have followed a populist line, as has 
been the case in the Western world. Through 
the analysis of an original dataset of political 
statements between 2014 and 2018, our find-
ings demonstrate that refugees have not been 
a big part of public policy and electoral debates, 
despite the increasing societal discontent, medi-
atization, and politicization around the presence 
of refugees, particularly Syrians, in Turkey. The 
anti-immigration rhetoric of political actors only 
partially subscribes to the transnational populist 
playbook of right-wing parties in Western democ-
racies. Refugee reception policies are often criti-
cized by the opposition in relation to political 
parties’ take on key foreign policy issues, namely 
the EU-Turkey migration diplomacy and AKP’s 
Syria policy, within which security and criminal-
izing discourses are enmeshed. Opposition MPs 
only resorted to economic threat discourses with 
a nativist populist tone when Syrians were seen 
as rivals in competition over scarce resources. 
However, even for more contested issues, such 
as granting citizenship to Syrians, opposition 
MPs warned about the hostility and violence that 
might target refugees, and hence refrained from 
going too far. As we show in this paper, the key 
reason for the selective use of anti-immigration 
rhetoric is because the predominantly Sunni 
Muslim Syrian refugees constitute ‘the ultimate 
other’ for neither the Turkish public nor politi-
cal actors. Refugees were instead seen as victims 
of the conflict but mostly of the wrong policy 
choices of the government. 
Our findings indicate that even though a popu-
list anti-immigrant discourse could be observed 
in Turkey, it did not dominate the political oppo-
sition. The relative weakness of such discourse, 
however, did not necessarily translate into dis-
cussions on integration and social cohesion but 
fostered more discussions on return policies. 
More importantly, we detected a civilizationist 
populism competing with and countering the 
Western-style anti-immigrant discourse. The 
AKP MPs counter critiques of their refugee poli-
cies with populist discourse that has an Islamic 
tone and is premised on moral superiority vis-
a-vis the anti-immigrant West. Political oppo-
sition to the ruling party’s migration policies 
did little to challenge this moral superiority 
discourse; on the contrary, as many MHP and 
CHP MPs’ statements indicate, they at times 
affirmed it. 
With its uninterrupted single-party rule for 
almost 17 years now, AKP’s civilizationist popu-
lism has established a hegemonic populist dis-
course that keeps the main opposition parties at 
bay and seems resilient to rights-based immigra-
tion discourse. This is a slippery slope for refu-
gee rights, as it leaves the fate of the refugee 
population to the discretion of the ruling party 
and is highly contingent on the AKP’s definition 
of ‘the people’ that, for the moment, selectively 
includes Syrian refugees. Yet, it has been able 
to define the parameters of political debates by 
marginalizing rights-based approaches to immi-
gration, which have only been embraced by HDP 
cadres and a few CHP MPs. In this context, there 
is always the danger of rights violations, includ-
ing of the minimum right to non-refoulement31 
that Syrian refugees have been enjoying, if the 
31 Non-refoulement is a fundamental international 
law principle that prohibits states from returning 
people seeking international protection to a country 
in which they would be in likely danger of facing per-
secution. 
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political cost of hosting refugees prevails in the 
eyes of the government.32 
Therefore, even though our findings are in line 
with the literature which shows that a dominant 
anti-immigrant discourse is independent of the 
actual number of migrants in a country, it also 
indicates that there might be other dynamics and 
forms of populism behind the absence of such 
rhetoric. Our discussion reveals that populist 
political discourse may even seemingly be more 
inclusive towards certain migrants depending 
on the definition of ‘the people’. This does not 
mean, however, that the populism and imagery 
of ‘the people’ mobilized by the AKP is pluralist 
per se, since it builds on the existing denial of the 
religious and ethnic diversity of Turkey, privileg-
ing the dominant religious identity over others. 
Hence, the Turkish case calls for more research 
on political debates regarding immigration in 
non-Western contexts receiving a relatively high 
level of migrants and/or refugees and that are 
already highly diverse. Such an endeavour would 
potentially contribute to conceptualizing the 
diversity of populisms, particularly its exclusion-
ary and inclusionary features, and plurality of 
‘the people’ around the issue of immigration that 
builds on existing ethno-religious cleavages.
32 Recent crackdown on Syrians living in Istanbul 
proves the slippery ground of rights-based approach-
es to international protection in Turkey: On July, 22 
2019, the Istanbul Governorate issued a statement 
and required Syrian nationals not registered in Istan-
bul returning to their province of registration saying 
that those have not been registered will be trans-
ferred to provinces determined by the Interior Minis-
try. The statement coupled with reports on recent de-
tention and deportation practices of Turkey, fostered 
debates on the extent to which ongoing “voluntary re-
turns to Syria” are indeed voluntary or forced. See for 
instance Turkey Forcibly Returning Syrians to Danger, 
Human Rights Watch, 26.07.2019 https://www.hrw.
org/news/2019/07/26/turkey-forcibly-returning-
syrians-danger (access date 01.10.2019). 
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